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Abstract. The article investigates the distinction between the physical and the inten-
tional causality that appeared in the 17th century scholasticism in the course of polem-
ics with the traditional Aristotelian classification of causes and with the conception of 
causality developed by Francisco Suárez. The introduction of the distinction between 
physical and intentional causation was motivated by the insufficiency of the notion of 
causality, adopted in ancient and medieval natural philosophy to describe the causal 
processes in the sphere of conscious human activity. The authors of the 17th century 
took as a base two concepts carefully elaborated by Suárez, that is, the concepts of 
influxus and of metaphorica motio, and, starting from them, introduced an additional 
concept of influxus intentionalis.
Keywords: physical / intentional causality; 17th century scholasticism; Francisco Suárez; 
influxus intentionalis.
Introduction
There is a widespread view that the Aristotelian classification of causes, 
that is, their division into material, formal, efficient (“the primary source 
of the change and rest”) and final – remained almost the only undisputed 
classification until the dissolution of Aristotelian science and philosophy 
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by the end of the 18th century.1 And yet, scholastic philosophical texts that 
were created in post-Suárezian era in the 17th- first half of the 18th centuries 
give a different picture. First, although the Aristotelian classification did 
certainly retain its dominance, it was recognized alongside with several 
classifications of causes that were based on the different – and multiple – 
criteria. One of the examples of this is a detailed classification presented 
by the Bavarian Jesuit Antonius Mayr (1739) in the Philosophia peripatetica: 
causes are divided into internal and external; both are further divided into 
potential (in actu primo) and actual (in actu secundo); further, the external 
cause is divided into appropriate and inappropriate, direct and indirect, etc. 
Only at the end of this series Mayr mentions “the most famous division of 
causes into genera, which belongs to Aristotle” (Mayr 1739, Pars II, d. III, 
q. 1, art. 2, n. 809, 329–330; n. 810, 330; n. 816, 332)2.
Second, there is a special problem related to the understanding of 
causality that arises within the early modern scholastic science of the 
soul. One of the most notable features of the treatises De anima written by 
generations of scholars after Suárez was splitting the fundamental concept 
of life into that of physical life (a mode of life that is characteristic of the 
vegetative level of living things, as well as of the acts of sensation, intellect 
and will as taken in their physiological basis and actual production) and of 
intentional life (acts of sensual and intellectual cognition, of appetition and 
will, taken in their content)3. This division of life and living things into two 
modes, widely accepted in the community of scholastic philosophers by the 
second quarter of the 17th century, demanded a thorough study of specific 
characteristics of each of these two modes, including the kind of causality 
that operates in the areas of physical and intentional life respectively.
1 So, even recent works are moving into the context of those four causes, with different 
accentuations (Carraud 2002; Fink 2015). 
2 All translations from Latin into English are mine. – G.V.
3 Arriaga 1639; De anima, disp. II, sect. I, subsect. I, § 6, p. 562: “Respondeo… distinguendo 
duplicem vitam, aliam physicam, intentionalem aliam. Intentionalis vita est idem quod 
cognitio et appetitio… Alia vita est physica… et quam plantis concedere intendimus”.
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1. Statement of the Problem
From the point of view of the science of the soul, there was one fundamen-
tal problem with the “most famous division of causes” that went back to 
Aristotle. This problem was summed up by another 18th century scholastic 
author, a Bavarian Benedictine Veremund Gufl (1750), in this way: “A lot 
of controversy and confusion arises from the fact that there is a general 
belief in the quaternary of the physical causes of Aristotle” (Gufl 1750, 
Pars I, tr. II, a. 3, § 3, n. 484, 265). In fact, the Aristotelian classification was 
well suited to describe causality in the world of natural bodies, the world 
that constituted the subject matter of ancient and medieval physics. That 
classification, however, could not account for the causality in the world that 
was built, defined and directed by meanings, especially in a period when 
the distinction of the two modes of life was being conceptualized. A purely 
naturalistic scheme of causes inevitably had to undergo deformation when 
one tried to apply it to the processes of knowing and goal-setting carried 
out in the mode of intentional life.
This deformation or, more precisely, the slow deconstruction of the 
Aristotelian scheme had begun long before the 17th century. It became nec-
essary to introduce some additional distinctions into the formal cause, first 
distinguishing as a separate cause the causa exemplaris – a “cause-sample”, 
or intellectual model, according to which things are to be created. The initial 
samples for everything (according to the scholastics who relied on Augustine 
in this regard) are the ideas in God, and the secondary samples are the ideas 
in the material intellect, in accordance with which works of craft and art are 
created. Further, in the same formal cause, it was necessary to make a distinc-
tion between the form, which is adopted in the portion of matter and makes 
the resulting thing a thing of a certain kind, and the form that is adopted in 
a cognitive ability and makes the thing being represented and known. On 
the other hand, the Aristotelian causa finalis demanded the distinctions as 
well. The final cause, which acts in nature as its immanent viability leading 
to full deployment of natural forms (ἐντελέχεια), could barely coexist in the 
same concept with the final cause in the field of meaningful human actions.
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By the 17th century it became quite obvious that the naturalistic scheme 
of the Philosopher, strictly interpreted, presupposed a pretty rough equivocal 
or – by the most favorable interpretation – an analogical, not univocal, 
concept of cause4. In fact, the distinction of physical/intentional causality 
was formed on the basis of these additional distinctions previously intro-
duced within the Aristotelian scheme (Vdóvina 2015). In the 17th century 
this particular distinction was adopted (as an alternative one to the above- 
mentioned scheme) in the science of the soul and other scholastic disciplines 
(including theology) that deal with conscious and meaningful acts and 
actions of the intellectual and volitional beings. This distinction was created 
not as a scheme ad hoc, but rather as a way to get away from the disordered 
and arbitrary ad hoc deformations of the Aristotelian scheme; moreover, 
as a way to think causality consistently and adequately to the nature of its 
work in two different modes of life. In fact, it is the intentional causality, 
which is the basis of any feeling and thinking as the coherent sequences of 
the motivated cognitive content. This alternative classification might be 
embedded in the Aristotelian scheme implicite et reductive and, in fact, in 
one way or another correlated with it, but rather for convenience (as the 
opportunity to save references to familiar concepts) and as a tribute to 
tradition rather than because of a genuine theoretical necessity. 
The purpose of this article is to explore different variations of the 
concepts of physical and intentional causality in post-Suárezian scholas-
ticism. For these distinctions, as we will show, a crucial point is the notion 
of influxus developed by Suárez in his Metaphysical Disputations, that is, 
a real “infusion” of being. It served as a basis for the concept of influxus 
intentionalis, which was elaborated in the subsequent period.
4 “Сausa physica ut dividitur in quatuor illa caussarum genera, non est ratio univoca, quia 
vere et proprie convenit causae efficienti, et materiali, quae vere et physice influunt in 
sua effecta, late vero et translatitie convenit causae finali et exemplari, cum non physice 
in effectus, sed solum intentionaliter influant” (Juaniz de Echalaz 1654, Physica, tract. II, 
disp. XXI, c. 4, n. 32, 398).
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2. Physical and Intentional influxus 
Let us start with several definitions: they will give us a reference point for 
further advancement. According to an earlier text written by Pedro Hurtado 
de Mendoza (Disputationes a summulis ad metaphysicam, 1617), the physical 
cause is that “which really, by its existing entity (per suam entitatem existen-
tem) contributes to the effect, whether it is a physical cause [in the narrow 
sense], that is, a natural one, belonging to the natural body or whether the 
cause is spiritual or supernatural, vital”. Such a cause, according to Hurtado, 
has real causal effects. On the contrary, the intentional cause “acts” only 
metaphorically. It does not act by its real entity, but operates through those 
that are more real than itself; it just inspires action or creates the conditions 
for action due to the fact that it is the object of cognition: “It is therefore 
called intentional cause, because it moves as an object, that is, as it exists 
intentionally, in the intellect”5.
Another definition can be found in the text of the Florentine broth-
er-minim Giovanni Battista Neri (1682): 
The cause can also be divided into the physical and the intentional one. The first 
is the one that by its existing entity works upon the effect; so here ‘physical’ is 
taken to stand for real entity... The intentional cause is that which flows into 
the effect not by its own entity, but by the entity of something else, that is, 
inasmuch as it exists in the intellect it moves the active potency to act. [Dividi 
etiam potest causa in physicam, et intentionalem; prima est, quae per suam 
entitatem existentem ad effectum concurrit; unde hic accipitur, ly physicum, 
pro reali entitate... Intentionalis vero causa illa, quae non influit in effectum 
per suam entitatem, sed per alienam, vicelicet in quantum existens ipsa in 
intellectu, potentiam activam movet ad agendum] (Neri 1682, 180).
5 “Causa physice influens est quae realiter per suam entitatem existentem concurrit ad effec-
tum, sive sit causa physica, id est, naturalis, pertinens ad corpus naturale, sive sit spiritua-
lis, aut supernaturalis: aut vitalis. Causa intentionalis est. a qua prodit effectus non tan-
quam a principio per suam entitatem in effectum, sed per alienam influente, ut finis, qui non 
influit per suam entitatem in effectum, sed per apprehensionem tanquam per movendi 
rationem, aut conditionem: ideo dicitur, causa intentionalis, quia movet ut obiectum, quod 
est existere intentionaliter, sive in intellectu”. Hurtado de Mendoza 1617. Physica, disp. 
VIII, sect. IX,§ 115, 315.
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This is quite a standard general definition; here is yet another one of 
many examples, taken from the course of Antonius Mayr: 
The external cause is divided into the physical and the intentional one. Physical 
cause is that which essentially and determinately stands behind the physical 
action that produces the effect: in this way the lion which is giving birth essen-
tially and determinately stands behind the action that produces the lion which 
is being born. The intentional cause is that which, having been cognized either 
motivates or directs the agent to make the effect. [Dividitur causa extrinseca 
in physicam, et intentionalem. Causa physica est, quae ab actione physice 
productiva effectus, essentialiter, et determinate respicitur: sic leo generans 
essentialiter, et determinate respicitur ab actione productiva leonis generati. 
Causa intentionalis est, quae ut cognita, vel movet, vel dirigit operantem ad 
ponendum effectum] (Mayr 1739, pars II, disp. III, q. 1, a. 2, n. 811; 330).
There are several what may be called “sensitive points” in these definitions. 
The first one is the basis on which these very different causae are included 
under the general notion of the cause. In fact, “the cause in the proper sense 
is the principle which infuses (influens) being in something dependent on 
it” [“Dicendum: causa proprie est principium influens esse in aliud cum 
dependentia huius ab illo” (Gufl 1750, Pars I, tract. II, a. 1, § 1–2, n. 425; 242); 
moreover, here under “being” (esse) not only being de novo is understood 
, that is, not just the emergence from non-being, but also any changes in 
the already existent things within any category of reality. After all, if any 
causing is a change, and every change is movement, and movement is, 
from the ontological point of view, a transition from the potential state 
to the actual one, this transition should be, so to say, “provided with the 
energy”. We could ask – provided by what? Precisely by that “supplement” 
of being which was lacking for the possible things to become actual. The 
concept of influxus, “infusion” of being, supports the entire concept of real 
causality ut sic in the work of Francisco Suárez6 and in all the post-Suárezian 
scholasticism. But this “infusion” is questionable even in regard to physical 
6 The doctrine of Suárez on the causes (DM, XII–XXVII), most recently has got into the 
focus of the research interest (Fink 2015; Schmid 2015: on influxus-theory of Suárez see 
396–401). 
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causes. Should it be understood in the weak or the strong sense? It is taken 
in the weak sense by the Spanish jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1617, 
1624), who believes that it is enough for physical causes to facilitate the 
effect by their very existence. In this case both the matter and the natural 
form of things should be counted among their real causes, because both of 
them undoubtedly contribute to the emergence and existence of material 
substance. Insofar as the concept of influxus is concerned, however, the 
“strong sense” seems to be more reasonable. Veremund Gufl puts this in 
the following way: 
Physical cause is called physical not just because it has physical effects, but 
because of the physical infusion, that is, physical mode of action that is real and 
subjective. [Causa physica est et dicitur Physica non praecise ratione effectus 
physici, sed ab influxum physicum seu modum agendi physicum, qui est realis 
ac subiectivus] (Gufl 1750, n. 430; 244).
The active action, exercitium, is necessary, Gufl believes, for the influxus of 
being by the physical causes. Which means that the matter and form are 
not, strictly speaking, physical causes (unless in a very broad sense) as they 
do not perform any special actions and do not “infuse” anything. They are 
simply two parts of a thing that have different modes of existence: as a part 
of a thing, matter exists due to informatio (formedness), and a form exists 
through receptio (acceptance in matter). Both of them exist while the thing 
itself exists, and the fact that their duration coincide may suggest there is no 
influxus here which would provide the generation of a being in the moment of 
transition from potency to act. Strictly speaking, the cause in the proper sense 
is only causa efficiens, which produces the union of the matter with the form.
Thus, in regard to the physical causes, except the efficient one, it is 
possible to question the reality of the “infusion of being”, but what about the 
intentional cause? Should it be considered as pure or simple representation 
of some objective meaning? That opinion was held by some of the scholastics 
and represented a “weak” variant of understanding the influxus intentionalis. 
“The object, or intentional cause”, writes the Dominican Ambrosio Lezard 
de Belliquadro (1664):
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[…] can only produce effect of the same kind, and it is representation, not the 
production of change that is implied by the intentional dimension […] Purely 
intentional action can only produce intentional effects in the representational 
being. [Obiectum seu causa intentionalis nequit effectum nisi eiusdem rationis 
producere; sed de ratione ordinis intentionalis est solum repraesentare, et 
non alterare […]. Actio mere intentionalis, solum effectus intentionales in 
esse repraesentativo, et non in esse alterativo producere potest] (Lezard de 
Belliquadro 1664: tomus IV, q. 5, a. 4 ; 88–89. 
It is no wonder that since intentional causality is limited to representations, 
it is considered as causality only in a figurative sense, or metaphorically. How 
and where could we detect causal function of the bare representation? The 
Jesuit thinker Nicolás Martínez (1678), for instance, observes this kind of 
causality in logical operations, i. e. in the field of purely semantic relations. 
Martínez draws an example: when we get the knowledge of the sun from 
the knowledge of the solar light, the idea of sunlight acts as the intentional 
cause of cognition of the sun because of the relation between the sun and 
its light. The representation of light as the light of the sun is here the “causa 
cognoscendi intentionaliter motiva solem” – “a cause that intentionally moves 
to the knowledge of the sun”7. This type of intentional causation occurs 
in all the a priori and a posteriori demonstrations, where it is expressed in 
purely semantic movement from one concept to another within the same 
cognitive potency, the intellect, and where intentional causation results in 
the semantic effect of thinking.
But this is not the only type of the intentional causation. Many scho-
lastics speak not only about the motivated semantic transitions within 
the senses or the intellect, but also about the impulse to action and about 
7 “In demonstratione a priori eadem est causa, propter quam est effectus, e propter quam, 
ut intentionaliter moventem, scitur effectus, ut sol est causa physica, et efficiens lucis, et 
propter connexionem, quam habet cum luce, est causa intentionaliter movens ad affir-
mandam lucem; in demonstrationibus a posteriori invenitur ordo physicus, et intentiona-
lis; quod enim est effectus in genere physico causae, est causa intentionalis, propter quam 
cognoscitur causa. Quamvis enim lux sit in genere efficientis effectus solis, propter con-
nexionem tamen, quam habet cum sole, est causa intentionaliter motiva cognoscendi so-
lem, In utraque igitur demonstratione importatur cognitio, quae sit causa illius scientiae; 
qua scitur conclusion”. (Martínez Hispalensis 1678. Controv. I, disp. IV, sect. I ; 40–41).
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the more tangible motivating effects of representations, as when a certain 
image or notion having been captured, its intentional content moves the 
agent or his potencies to act. Here Gufl expounds his approach in the most 
direct and uncompromising way as he argues for there to be the influxus 
intentionalis in the strong sense, as a special intentional infusion of being:
The intentional cause is and bears this name due to the intentional infusion... 
which is the case in so far as there is an act of cognition. And it should be that 
the intentional cause not only determines the act oriented towards itself, but also 
moves to act, because the effect of this cause is to encourage the agent. It moves 
as an object, whereas the agent is moved as a subject. [Causa intentionalis est et 
dicitur ratione influxus intentionalis, qui idem est ac obiectivus, quique posita 
cognitione duntaxat locum habet. Oportet autem, ut causa intentionalis non 
praecise specificet actum ad se tendentem sed etiam moveat ad agendum: 
quoniam agens moveri est illius causae effectus: movet enim obiective, ut agens 
moveatur subiective] (Gufl 1750, n. 431 ; 244).
3. Exemplar Causality
The further development of the concept of intentional causes depended on 
whether the influxus intentionalis was understood in the strong or in the 
weak sense. What will come of the intentional causality, if, for the sake of 
convenience, we try to match it – following the scholastic philosophers – 
with a modified Aristotelian classification? Let us go back to the scheme 
of Antonius Mayr. According to him, “the intentional cause is divided into 
the exemplary (exemplaris), final and moral”. The exemplary cause, the 
cause-sample, is also referred to by Mayr as idea, and this idea can be 
internal if it is the image in the soul (for example, the image of a house in 
the soul of the architect), and external if it is an external thing (for instance, 
Peter, who serves as a prototype for the image in the portrait)8. And here we 
8 “Jam causa intentionalis subdividitur in exemplarem finalem et moralem. Causa exempla-
ris, seu idealis est, quae dirigit artificem, seu causam efficientem ad assimilandum sibi 
effectum: sic idea, quam architectus in mente concepit de fabricanda domo, est causa 
exemplaris, sive idealis domus: item Petrus, cui curat se depingi, est causa idealis imagi-
nis, a pictore ad similitudinem Petri factae. Addo, si talis idea est conceptus in mente ar-
tificis existens, dicitur idea intrinseca: si vero est aliquid prototypon externum, e.g. Petrus 
depingendus, dicitur idea extrinseca.”. (Mayr 1739; Pars II, disp. III, q. 1, a. 2, n. 813; 331).
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come to the second sensitive point of the causa intentionalis concept which 
has to do with the interpretation of the impact of the sample, exemplar. 
According to Mayr, an idea is causal not in the sense of motivating someone 
to action, but in that it intentionally directs the agent, i. e., it acts upon 
him as a direct efficient cause, completely determining the nature of his 
actions through the knowledge of the sample, forcing him to conform with 
itself, to imitate itself: when building a house, painting a portrait, writing 
an essay, a novel, etc. 
It is against this understanding of the idea as the intentional cause that 
the same implacable Veremund Gufl speaks out:
If we take the sample correctly, it is not the sample which causes something 
created on its model, but the master. And it does not move the master to create 
works, but just exposes itself (exhibet) so that the master could imitate it. 
Similarly, when someone wants to depict an external thing - for example, the 
mountain, - the real mountain does not make any infusion into the depicted 
mountain. [Nam si recte exemplar inspiciamus, ipsum per se nec causat exem-
platum, sed artifex, nec movet artificem, ut illud conficiat sed praecise semet 
exhibet, ut ipsum artifex imitari queat, non alio modo, ac siquis rem externam 
v.g. montem depingat: mons realis enim nullum praestat influxum in montem 
depictum] (Gufl 1750, n. 432; 244).
It is also impossible to say that the idea causes the way of the master`s 
actions, because it functions as a model merely through exposing itself 
(per meram exhibitionem), and not through some infusion or impression: 
But the object as the object does not have, properly speaking, the meaning of 
the cause, even if it gives a specific determination to the act and gives occasion 
for performing the act in one way or another and for adopting one predicate or 
another. [Dicendum, quod idea causat, ut agens hoc vel illo modo agat, non per 
influxum aut motionem aliquam sed per meram sui exhibitionem ac praecise 
obiecti munus subeundo. Atqui obiectum qua obiectum non habet proprie 
rationem causae, tametsi specificet actum sitque ratio, cur actus hoc vel illo 
modo exeat, haec vel illa habeat praedicata] (Gufl 1750, n. 435; 245).
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As a result of that, Gufl takes the idea-sample out of the classification of 
causes and regards it as a variant of simple objects of intellectual consider-
ation. In other words, Gufl treats the intentional causality in the strongest 
sense, as the conceptual motivation, and not just cognition. But this infusion 
(influxus) still remains within the boundaries of intentional causality. 
It is interesting to compare this debate between two late scholastic 
philosophers, for whom the distinction of physical /intentional causation 
was the natural and most adequate way of thinking causality within the 
intentional life, with the position of Francisco Suárez, formulated in the 
Metaphysical Disputations (1597). It is known that this work of Suárez con-
tains the most extensive and most complete consideration of the causes in 
the whole scholastic tradition. The cause-sample is viewed in the Disputation 
XXV (Renemann 2010). Suárez, who did not yet know the above-mentioned 
distinction, tried to interpret causa exemplaris within the boundaries of the 
physical, naturalistic concept of causality. On the one hand, his description 
of the causal action of the internal exemplar or internal idea is reminiscent 
of the description given by Mayr:
For those who act reasonably (per intellectum) the sample is necessary by itself, 
so that they could rationally direct their action to achieve a certain effect. For 
as by their nature they are not limited to give certain forms to the effects as 
it is the case in the natural agents, they should be determined to act in an 
intellectual way that is proper to them. And although from the point of view 
of exercising their action (quoad exercitium) they are defined by the will, yet 
in regard to specific determination and direction they are led by the intellect. 
And for this they need their own models of such effects in order to be able to 
produce them skillfully and wisely. [in iis enim quae per intellectum operantur, 
per se necessarium est exemplar, ut rationabili modo possint actionem suam 
in definitum effectum dirigere; nam cum a natura sua non sint limitata ad 
determinatas formas effectibus tribuendas, sicut naturalia agentia, oportet ut suo 
proprio et intellectuali modo determinentur. Quamvis autem quoad exercitium 
suae actionis determinentur per voluntatem, tamen quoad specificationem 
et directionem ducuntur per intellectum; ad hoc autem indigent propriis 
exemplaribus talium effectuum, ut artificioso et intellectuali modo possint illos 
efficere] (DM, Disp. XXV, sect. 2, n. 1).
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In this passage, Suárez emphasizes the formative, determinative role of 
the sample. Alongside with that Suárez wants to explain the causa exemplaris 
as a real cause, and this is why he needs to find some real “infusion of 
being” in its action. He does not yet know about the intentional infusion 
(and Gufl, who is aware of the concept, does not see this infusion in the 
cause-sample); therefore, he needs to find a physical infusion. Suárez sees 
it in the fact that exemplary cause, in his view, acts not as the formal, but as 
the efficient cause – producing the agent himself as the agent who actually 
performs certain actions and thus produces well-defined effects:
The position of those who... say that it (the cause-sample) pertains to the 
efficient cause seems to me more reasonable. […] The causality of the sample 
pertains to the efficient causality... the sample is referred to the master as the 
proximate form by which he acts in his own way. Therefore, as the form of the 
agent pertains to the efficient cause [and] as it is the principle of action for 
him, the sample, because it is a form of the master by which he acts, pertains 
to the efficient cause. [Mihi tamen magis probate sententia eorum qui… illam 
pertinere dicunt ad causam efficientem. Francisco Suárez. Disp. XXV, sect. 2, 
num. 12: “Ultimo probatur directe, causalitatem exemplaris ad efficientiam 
pertinere… ipsum exemplar comparatur ad artificem, ut proxima forma per quam 
suo modo operatur; sicut ergo forma agentis ad efficientem causam pertinet, 
quatenus est illi principium agendi, ita et exemplar, quatenus est forma artificis, 
qua operatur, ad efficientem causam pertinent] (DM, Disp. XXV, sect. 2, n. 8).
It is difficult not to see a certain infringement on the very notion of the idea 
in Suárez’s attempt to interpret physically the causal effect of the idea and 
to understand the exemplum as a natural principle or a meaningful efficient 
factor of human activities. In accordance with the common understanding 
and with Suárez’s own detailed explanation in the first section of the same 
Disputation XXV, the idea is a formal concept in the intellect and, of course, 
it is a real physical formal cause of a representation that is found in the 
intellect. Representation is that of the exemplum in accordance with which 
something is to be created outside of the intellect or, at least, outside of 
the concept in which the sample is thought. Up to this point Suárez does 
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not contradict himself, and agrees with the tradition. But as soon as he 
tries to make the direct leap from non-naturalistic, purely intentional, 
objective content of the concept to the physical shaping of the real human 
activity, seeing here a real infusion of being (influxus) from the content 
of the idea, the question arises: how is this possible? Suárez says that the 
idea completes the determination of those actions directly, giving them the 
final specification which presets, through these steps, the production of 
an effect appropriate to the sample present in mind. But this direct impact 
of the intentional content on the nature of a physical act falls under the 
ontological ban of the direct impact of spirit on matter or matter on spirit: 
the ban that Suárez himself took as a basis of his teaching about the soul. 
Again, in other words: assuming that the intentional content of the idea 
really makes the agent to be the agent, Suárez makes something purely 
imaginable and non-real (in the sense of non-physical) into the physical 
efficient cause of real things. The explanation, which is natural (in our 
opinion and in the opinion of the 17th century scholarship) and according 
to which the agent is simply following the meaning of the sample, and his 
actions are semantically determined by the intentional content of the idea, – 
this explanation does not suit Suárez because it does not fit into the concept 
of influxus physicus as the unique and universal principle of causality, valid 
for the world of things and for the world of human beings. This insoluble 
contradiction in Suárez’s doctrine of exemplary causality indicates that the 
purely naturalistic explanation of meaningful human activity had virtually 
exhausted its explanatory potentiality by the 17th century, and that scholastic 
philosophy was in need of conceptualizing some form of causality that would 
be appropriate for the specifically human mode of thinking and acting.
4. Moral Causality
The third sensitive point of the theory of two types of causes has to do with 
the moral cause as related to the will. Mayr and many other authors of the 
17th century consider it to be a kind of intentional cause, and sometimes 
just put the sign of equality between the two terms. But the fact is that the 
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expression causa moralis refers to two different kinds of causation which 
should be carefully distinguished in the exact description of volitional 
acts. On the one hand, the will is itself a free efficient cause, a cause that 
in presence of all the necessary conditions for the action is free to choose 
between acting or not acting. In this sense, the moral cause is the will, 
understood as a natural ability; it is “identical to the physical cause” and is 
one of the subspecies of the efficient cause as such9. 
Taken in another sense, moral causality of the will corresponds not to the 
real physical action in the world of natural beings, but to what scholastics 
called “the moral being” (esse morale), that is, to the realm of established 
social rules, institutions, and norms. “Moral being” is the only domain of 
being wholly determined not by the natural relations, but by the relations 
of meanings and symbols (relations of domination and subordination, 
possession of rights and duties, etc.), and therefore it is intentional, and 
not physical, by its definition. Any action caused by the order of someone 
in charge, and any call for action, enforcement of action or refraining from 
action based on a particular form of social relations is interpreted, accord-
ingly, as a manifestation of the intentional moral causality10.
5. Final Causality
The fourth sensitive point is how the intentional causality is associated with 
setting and achieving the goals. In relation to human beings scholastics 
9 “Causa moralis duplex est: alia physice influens per se, quae est causa libera: liberum 
enim et morale idem esse patebit in livris de anima, de qua causa morali in praesenti non 
agitur, quia est idem cum causa physica” (Hurtado de Mendoza 1617, Physica, disp. VIII, 
sect. IX, § 116; 315). 
10 “Causa moralis est, quae movet causam effcicientem, quia est: sic imperium domini mo-
vet servum, ut laboret, non ut detur imperium (non enim laborat, ut imperetur labor), 
sed quia datur, aut est imperium. Alia autem est causa moralis alliciens, alia retractens, 
alia neglecta. Prima movet ad agendum: secunda vero absterret ab agendo: tertia, licet in 
mentem veniat, et posset movere, vel absterrere, tamen negligitur…”. (Mayr 1739; Pars II, 
disp. III, q. 1, a. 2, n. 815; 332). “[…] haec autem causa intentionalis, seu moralis, dupliciter 
etiam accipi potest, primo pro causa libera, quo pacto causae physicae non opponitur, 
alio modo, prout non influit in effectum, adscibitur illi tamen dictus effectus; quia illum 
mandat, ac praecipit” (Neri 1682, 180). 
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distinguished between several subtypes of final causes: finis quo (literally, 
“the end by which”: the intermediate goal which serves as the means of 
achieving other goals), finis cui (literally, “the end to which” – “for the good 
of”: a thing or a person for whose sake something is done), and the finis 
qui (literally, “the end which” - that which is the object of desire for its own 
sake). The latter is the final cause in the most precise and strict sense of 
the word. Sometimes this is an existing thing, in other cases, and perhaps 
most often, a non-existing one, and the effect of this kind of a goal is the 
fact that it comes into existence: ut fit. The still-not-existing goal is the 
quintessence of the final cause, and in a certain sense it is the quintessence 
of the intentional causality as such.
Although a number of paradoxes, related to specifying the causal nature 
of the goal and its impact on the agent has long attracted the attention of 
philosophers, beginning with Plato, and – in the Medieval period – with 
Avicenna, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Ockham, and others, we take 
again the Metaphysical Disputations by Francisco Suárez as the starting point. 
The Disputation XXIII is devoted to the final cause. Suárez was one of the 
latest scholastic authors who did their best to defend the integrity of the 
final cause, despite the obvious and significant difference between the three 
agents – God, natural things and highly organized living creatures, especially 
humans. Suárez was indeed one of the last authors who attempted to defend 
the exclusively physical nature of the final causality. Since we are interested 
in this question in the context of the doctrines on human intentionality, 
we will focus on how Suárez sees the causal action of the goal in humans11.
11 In relation to the subject of the final cause of Suárez it is worth paying attention to 
(Schmid 2015): The article also contains an impressive bibliography. However, it should 
be noted that the research workers who do not address post-Suárezian scholastic texts 
usually overlook the formation of the distinctions of the physical/intentional causality 
within them. Therefore, stating the essential tensions within the naturalistic descriptions 
of the formal and the final cause of Suarez, they either enclose a Sisyphean effort to keep 
any kind of causality in the framework of Aristotelian naturalism, believing that it was the 
desire of scholasticism of the turn of 16th-17th centuries, or, on the contrary, accuse Suarez 
of the impossibility of such retention and consider it to be his failure. Meanwhile, Suárez 
represents here a transitional figure as well: it were his elaborations served as the basis to 
rethink the Aristotelian concept of the causality, although it may have been contrary to 
the subjective intentions of Suárez. See further in the text.
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If the essence of the causation itself is real “infusion of being” (influxus), 
a non-existent goal can certainly have no physical influence on another 
internal potency (the will), and even less on the external human behavior. 
It is well-known, however, that real actions are directed at the non-existent 
goals, and that these actions issue from the will which is intentionally 
aimed at these goals. And yet, it is forbidden both by scholastic physics and 
metaphysics for real effects to be produced by an unreal cause. Therefore, 
it is necessary to explain the reality of final causation that issues from 
a non-existent thing or a non-existent state of affairs. Suárez’s explanation 
proceeds in two steps: 1) he introduces the notion of the metaphorical 
motion (metaphorica motio) by which the intellect who presents a non-
-existent object of thought to the will causes its attraction to the object, 
and thereby actualizes it; 2) the actualized will (actus voluntatis) as an active 
potency is perfectly real and it physically directs further actions (actiones) 
of its owner to achieve the goal. The metaphoric motion on the part of the 
intellect and the physical act of the will are one and the same act in reality: 
as derived from the representation of the goal in the intellect it is caused 
metaphorically; as a guide of human actions, it itself is causal, namely 
as the efficient cause of these actions.12 Actio, imagined as a pure action 
(fingatur esse pura actio) is an effect in one kind of causation and a cause in 
another; but they are only mentally distinguished by the distinctio rationis. 
For example, if the intellect metaphorically moves the will to write a letter, 
presenting an unwritten letter to it as a goal, and the will actually moves 
someone to write, in reality this is not two actions but just one, “because 
12 “Est ergo tertia sententia, quae constituit etiam hanc finis causalitatem in motione meta-
phorica. Addit vero huiusmodi motionem non poni in actu secundo nisi quando voluntas 
in actu secundo movetur, et quando sic ponitur in re, non esse aliquid distinctum ab ipso-
met actu voluntatis. Sed sicut supra dicebamus unam et eamdem actionem, prout fluit ab 
agente, esse causalitatem eius, ut vero inest materiae, esse etiam causalitatem eius circa 
formam, ita aiunt unam et eamdem actionem voluntatis causari a fine et a voluntate ipsa, 
et prout est a voluntate esse causalitatem effectivam, prout  vero est a fine esse causalita-
tem finalem, et priori ratione esse motionem realem ac propriam, quia talis actio manat 
a potentia ut a proprio principio physico, posteriori autem ratione esse motionem me-
taphoricam, quia manat ab obiecto alliciente et trahente ad se voluntatem”. (DM, XXIII, 
sect. 4, n. 8).
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the two are so interconnected that they cannot be separated”. And in no 
way we can assume that the motion on the part of the intellect is secondary 
and accidental, as it stands in the beginning of the entire causal chain and 
the act of writing would not take place without it. Therefore, it should be 
considered as the real original cause of the act of writing. The conclusion 
is that although the movement by which a non-existent conceivable goal 
actualizes the will is metaphorical and non-physical, its ultimate conse-
quence - the specific behavior of a human - is real and physical, because the 
metaphorical motion actualizes the will really, and the real act of the will 
naturally produces real physical effects. According to Suárez, this allows us 
to assert that a non-existent goal is the necessary and integral principle 
of these real and physical actions. Hence, the final cause is real. Thus, the 
naturalistic interpretation of the final cause and causality in general has 
reached the aim; the Aristotelian scheme is saved.
Suárez obviously uses here the same explanatory strategy he used in 
the interpretation of the action of the cause-sample. It is clear that all the 
reasoning of Suárez rests on one key assumption: the metaphoric motion on 
the part of the intellect is capable of physically actualizing another ability 
that is the will. Being non-real in the indicated sense, it produces the real 
effect13. Ontologically it represents only the pure conceivable being (ens 
rationis),14 but its causality is quite real:15 it is impossible to understand 
otherwise this statement of Suárez, repeated many times and formulated in 
various ways. By its very nature the statement, however, is self-contradictory, 
and apparently this contradiction is insoluble within the purely naturalistic 
understanding of the causes, when the causal action is taken exclusively as 
the “infusion” of real being. No matter how sophisticated are the distinctions 
13 “[…] haec autem motio aliquid est in rerum natura; non est enim aliquid imaginarium vel 
fictum per intellectum; et aliquod genus causalitatis est, quandoquidem est origo opera-
tionum realium” (DM, XXIII, sect. 1, n. 7).
14 “Haec causalitas quodammodo est moralis et quasi artificiosa et intellectualis” (DM, 
XXIII, sect. 4, n. 16).
15 “Eius autem motio dicitur metaphorica, non quia non sit realis, sed quia non fit per in-
fluxum effectivum, nec per motionem intentionalem et animalem, et ideo nihil obstat 
quominus vera ac propria sit eius causalitas. (DM, XXIII, sect. 1, n. 14).
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between different types of causation fused in the same act of the will, they 
are produced by the mind (as distinctiones rationis) in the already actualized 
will, that is, post factum. They do not explain how it was possible for the 
metaphorical motivation to make a conceivable but non-existent object 
to produce a physical effect, that is, an actualization of the will. How does 
this motivation overcome the ontological ban on the transition from the 
domain of something conceivable to the domain of something real? How is 
it possible to circumvent the physical law of adequacy between the cause 
and the effect?
Suárez gives no answer to these questions. But it was Suárez who, while 
relying on the previous tradition, developed the concepts of influxus, on one 
hand, and of metaphorica motio, on the other, that is, those concepts that were 
used by his younger contemporaries when they shifted the entire question to 
the context of the dichotomy between the physical and intentional causality 
and resolved the difficulties in their own way. This meant the rejection of 
the purely naturalistic understanding of the causes and the establishment 
of the sphere of meanings as of the condition without which human actions 
and human intentionality as such would remain totally unexplainable.
6. After Suárez: the 17th century Discussion
In 1617, the year Suárez died, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza enters – already 
in the first edition of his course Disputationes de uniuersa philosophia - into 
the direct controversy with the great Jesuit. Let us look at his remarkable 
argument (Hurtado de Mendoza 1617, De anima, disp. XIII, sect. V, § 25–33; 
897–901). “Father Suárez, -writes Hurtado,- in volume I of Metaphysical 
Disputations, Disp. 2, part 1, sets as the first principle and the dogma that 
the final cause is a real cause. But I believe that we need to differentiate in 
order to avoid ambiguity”. First, the words of Suárez can be so understood 
that the thing which serves as a goal, is real. We have found that this is 
completely unnecessary, and most often the finis qui is a thing or a state 
of affairs which does not yet exist. Second, those words may mean that the 
very causality of the final cause is real. “In this sense, I believe that the 
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final cause as a final one is not real, that is, it does not produce physical 
and real infusion in the effect”, if we take the goal as a non-existent thing.
All the causality of the goal consists in drawing the will to itself, because the 
goal moves by its goodness, and its motion consists in causing love. Therefore, 
although the goal does not produce any physical infusion, we can understand it 
to have full causal power if it has goodness. We should understand, however, that 
it causes precisely because it completes the act of love by its goodness, without 
physical infusion. [Tota causalitas finis consistit in attractione voluntatis as 
se: movet enim per suam bonitatem: cuius motio consistit in amabilitate: ergo 
licet finis nullum habeat physicum influxum, intelligitur habere totam virtutem 
causativam, si habeat bonitatem: actu autem intelligetur causare eo praecise, 
quod terminet amorem ratione suae bonitatis sine physico influx] (Hurtado de 
Mendoza 1617, De anima, disp. XIII, sect. V, § 27; 897–898).
Third, yet another argument against the reality of the goal as of the cause is 
the common opinion that the goal is the principle of “metaphorical, that is, 
intentional, motion (metaphorica, sive intentionalis motio)”, because “the will 
is drawn to the goal through its representation. Therefore, I believe that the 
goal is not formally a real cause, and the definition of the cause corresponds 
to it only in a figurative sense (translatitie [sic!])”. Suárez argues that the 
motion is metaphorical, but its effect, the desire of the will, is real and not 
fictitious. In response, Hurtado distinguishes between the incentive motion 
(motio), and the real physical infusion of being, (influxus):
Note that the motivation is different from the infusion: infusion is the actual 
motion by which the cause physically affects the effect; the motivation is the 
capturing of the object that implies a desire for it. It is in this way that we are 
motivated by something that does not exist, moreover, often even by that which 
cannot exist. Therefore this consequence is wrong: motivates, therefore, causes 
physically: in fact, the goal motivates not physically but through knowledge. 
[Adverte, motionem differre ab influxu\\\; quod influxus sit actualis motus per 
quem cuasa physice influit in effectum: motio autem est apprehensio obiecti, 
ex qua sequitur illius appetitio: sic nos movent quae non sunt: immo saepe 
quae non possunt esse. Unde non valet haec consequentia: movet; ergo causat 
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physice, quia non movet physice, sed per cognitionem] (Hurtado de Mendoza 
1617, § 29; 898).
Let us sum up what we have reached here. A non-existent goal is present in 
the intellect only as known, that is, only as the content of the intellectual 
repraesentatio; it can attract the will and be the completion and the term of 
its act only as the intentional content. There is nothing physical in it as in 
the object of the willful intention, and it cannot cause any physical motion. 
It is real only in the sense that it is seen by the will in its goodness, and the 
will is by nature drawn to the good as to the substantial completion of its 
own act of love. This appetence for the intentional object as residing in the 
intellect is itself intentional; it remains within the immanent mental acts, 
within the purely intentional life: not fictitious, but not physical either. 
Completing a willful act, serving as its term, the goal performs a metaphorical 
motion, motio, which is what the above-mentioned authors identified as 
influxus intentionalis, and rather in the weak than in the strong sense.
Now, how is it possible to go out from this intentional reality and 
intentionalis influxus? How to pass from the relation between the purely 
intentional object of the intellect and the purely intentional love it inspires 
to the physical actions of the will, to the fact that it provides the means of 
achieving the goal and dictates to the humans the appropriate course of 
actions? In order to understand this, we need to learn what the intentional 
realities are ontologically, and for this, Hurtado says, it is necessary to 
distinguish between “the fiction and fictitious thing”. The fictitious thing, 
that is, the non-existent goal itself, has a purely mental being, but fictio is 
an act, a real and physical act of thinking a non-existent thing. Therefore, 
it is necessary to distinguish between the motio metaphorica or intentionalis 
influxus from a non-existent object, and the motio or influxus physicum from 
the intellectual act by which this object is conceived. In the words of Hurtado 
de Mendoza, “the object does not move the will formally, but only completes 
its act of love; but the will is moved by the intellect... Therefore, cognition 
is... the directly motivating principle”, but not “the terminative principle”; 
it is not what completely determines the will, but the efficient cause of 
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the motion. The non-existent goal, by contrast, “terminates” the will and 
completely determines it meaningfully, but does not move physically. The 
general conclusion is as follows:
The goal “moves not physically”, and not fictitiously, but intentionally... As it 
really moves through the act of the intellect, it is said that it moves truly, and 
not fictitiously, but not because it is a real and physical cause, although it is 
real as opposed to a fictitiously moving thing. [...nec movet physice, nec ficte, 
sed intentionaliter, et quia re ipsa movet per intellectum dicitur movere vere, et 
non ficte: non propterea est causa realis et physica: licet sit realis ut opponitur 
ficte moventi] (Hurtado de Mendoza 1617, § 29; 898.
This conclusion is confirmed by the comparison:
Just as the object that terminates the act of vision and the species impressa that 
produces this act make the entire principle of vision on the part of the object, so 
the goodness of the goal and the act of its cognition make the entire principle 
of volition on the part of the object. [Quemadmodum ex obiecto terminante 
visionem, et specie impressa eam efficiente conflatur integrum principium 
visioneis ex parte obiecti, ita ex bonitate finis et eius cognitione conflatur 
integrum principium ex parte obiecti] (Hurtado de Mendoza 1617, § 37; 900).
Let us summarize again the reasoning of Hurtado in this dispute with Suárez. 
1) A non-existent goal is conceived by the intellect. 2) The goal itself is in 
the intellect only intentionally, as represented, and, as such, it meaningfully 
and intentionally completes the determination of the will, attracting it by 
the metaphorical motion. 3) However, this intentional representation of 
the goal is retained in the intentional being not on its own, but by the real 
and physical act of the intellect. 4) Being real and physical, this act really 
and physically actualizes the will. It is not the intentional object as such, 
i. e., not the non-existent goal which directly, by the metaphorical motion, 
physically activates the will in the forbidden transition from the domain 
of thinking into the domain of real existence, but the act of the intellect 
which conceives an unreal goal real and physical. 5) Those distinctions are 
valid not only for the final cause that affects the will. They will be valid 
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for the causa exemplaris (assuming, against Gufl and following Mayr, that 
motio intentionalis is sufficient for the intentional causation), and for purely 
cognitive acts as well, because the same is the case, for example, with the 
act of sensual perception: species impressa completes the determination 
of the act of the sensual capacity by its intentional content taken from the 
virtual object and represents it virtually, and then physically actualizes it by 
its physical reality, that is, the reality of quality-accident. 6) Both do occur 
in the same act, which combines the effects of intentional and physical 
causes, and not of two different types of physical causes, as Suárez believed.
This implies, among other things, that the physical existence or nonex-
istence of the external object does not make a difference from the point of 
view of the internal mechanism of intentional causation. Regardless of any 
previous settings in relation to the outside world, the intentional causality 
works only with the immanent content. As John of St. Thomas, one of the 
strongest Dominican philosophers and theologians of the 17th century, 
puts it: 
[…] the intelligible and intentional causality does not require the presence of 
an object in the real being (entitative), because even if the object is present in 
the real being, it acts on the will not by its real being, but by its cognoscibility 
and its species, which it leaves in the potency as its intentional seed, where the 
object of the potency is present intentionally... Hence, whether the subject 
has the real being or not, it is irrelevant for its efficient causal influence on 
the will or on another potency. [efficientia intelligibilis et intentionalis, non 
requirit obiectum entitative praesens, siquidem obiectum quantum cumque 
entitative praesens sit, non operatur in voluntatem per suam entitatem, sed per 
suam cognoscibilitatem, et speciem relictam in potentia tanquam semen eius 
intentionale, ubi obiectum eius praesens est intentionaliter; ergo sive obiectum 
entitative sit, sive non, parum refert ad efficientiam in voluntatem aut in aliam 
potentiam (Juan de Santo Tomás 1667, q. LXI, disp. XXI, a. III, dub. Tertium; 72).
John of St. Thomas proceeds on the two sides of the same act of causation: 
This efficient causation is not only moral (i.e., intentional – G.V.), but also 
physical, because the very act of cognizing, intentionally embracing the object 
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is, however, a physical perfection, a power and an act of the intellect. So, it can 
move physically and act on the potencies that are movable by its power. And 
what is physical in respect to one thing is moral (i.e., intentional) in respect to 
another: in fact, it is physical in relation to the motion within the potencies, but 
intentional in relation to an external effect. [Neque efficientia ista moralis est, 
sed etiam physica, quia cognitio ipsa, et si intentionaliter continens obiectum, 
physica tamen perfectio et virtus et actus intellectus est; unde physice movere 
motest, et agere in potentias mobiles a se. Id tamen quod est physicum respectu 
unius, est morale respectu alterius; physice enim se habet ad potentias movendas 
intra se, moraliter autem respctu exterioris effectus] (Ibidem). 
There are many similar examples for that. 
Conclusion
What results from all this? First, the post-Suárezian scholasticism distin-
guishes a special kind of the intentional causation that is purely semantic 
and causes by the objective content of the concepts. It is metaphorical only 
in the sense that it does not mean the physical “infusion of being”, but 
is it real as the meaningful completion and termination of cognitive and 
volitional potencies, which is a necessary condition for their activation. The 
internally motivated motion of meanings forms the content of intentional 
life as a whole. Second, the intentional being of mental contents and, conse-
quently, their causal force cannot “support themselves”; they are always in 
need of being supported by physical acts of real vital capacities of physical 
life. Third, the inseparability of the two sides of acts in the intentional/
physical causation, through which the intentional life of the intellect and 
of the will develops, not to mention the lower levels of cognition and 
desire, raises the question of how it is possible in this perspective, if it is 
possible at all, to account for Locks`s separation of the “consciousness” and 
the “singular person”, and – in a more general way – for the fundamental 
disconnection between the intentional life and its physical bearer, and its 
transfer (per impossibile) to any other bearer, to follow what Locke says on 
the matter in chapter 27 of the An Essay Сoncerning Human Understanding 
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(Locke 1894, c. 27). The topic of physical/intentional causality in the 17th 
century scholasticism can also contribute to the contemporary discussion 
of functionalistic approach in the philosophy of mind. 
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